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I. Introduction
Rapid increases in law school tuition costs and the increasingly
large debt burdens incurred by law school students have led to numerous
economic issues being raised relative to the "market" for law school
students. Will future law school tuition increases be inhibited by
potential students' ability and willingness to pay? Will increasing debt
burdens skew law students' career choices towards higher paying
specialties? Will enrollment in law schools and/or the quality of law
school applicants decline and will any such declines be widespread or
concentrated in a few lower quality law schools? Given all of the above
questions, what criteria should law schools use to allocate the limited
financial aid resources they have available? These are but a few of the
economic issues relating to the law student market that law schools must
confront.
Prior research by academic economists and lawyers provide some useful
insights into the workings of the market for law students. First, studies
by economists of the labor market for lawyers suggest that it is dangerous
to project trends. Whether one uses a simple "cobweb model" or a more
sophisticated "rational expectations model", one observes that the number
of law school applicants is sensitive to earnings levels in the
profession.' Moreover, studies that utilize both U.S. and Canadian data
suggest that, other things equal (including demand), an increased supply
of graduates from law schools inevitably leads to lower real earnings of
new entrants in the profession.2
Second, increasing law school costs and/or decreasing real earnings
of lawyers may well lead to a decline in the number and quality of
applicants to law schools.3 Recent empirical evidence suggests this has
2happened; since the early 1980s the quality of law school applicants (as
measured by LSAT scores, grade point averages, or the fraction of
applicants coming from the most prestigious undergraduate institutions)
has dropped and the number of applicants fell between 1982 and l985.
Third, even after one controls for individual lawyers' personal
characteristics such as age, experience, race, region of residence and
sex, lawyers' earnings systematically vary with the type of law they are
practicing (e.g., private practice, corporate, judicial clerkship,
government, public interest).5 Moreover, it appears that individual
lawyers' occupational decisions, in particular the decision whether to
enter private or public interest law practices, depend on differences in
their expected earnings in the two types of practices, as well as their
underlying political and social attitudes.6
Fourth, there is some evidence that a law student's class rank and
the quality of the law school he or she attended influence the probability
that he or she will initially be employed by a large law firm.7 As is
well known, larger law firms tend to offer higher starting salaries.8
Finally, recent work by economists on college student debt in general
and law student debt in particular suggests that the debt is manageable,
in the sense that viewed as a long-term investment that yields higher
future earnings it makes sense for students to undertake the
indebtedness.9 The real policy issues are whether annual and/or lifetime
borrowing limits under federal programs will be increased often enough to
permit continual increases in law schools' tuition levels and whether
repayment periods will-be sufficiently lengthened to reduce the impact of
3high annual repayment levels on the decision to enter law school and law
students' choice of careers)°
Much of the prior research, especially that done by lawyers, quite
reasonably treats law schools as part of a single group and seeks
cooperative solutions to the problems that the group faces. Yet it is
quite clear that law schools by necessity compete with each other on a
number of dimensions including the recruitment of students, the
recruitment of faculty, the placement of graduates, and the attraction of
gifts and endowments. As such, it makes sense when addressing some
problems to view law schools as competitors and this is the approach that
I take in much of what follows.
I begin in the next section by presenting an empirical analysis of
how the market for law school students functions at a point in time. In
particular I conduct an econometric analysis of the interrelationships
between law school tuition levels, law school quality, law faculty
salaries, and the starting salaries of law school graduates. The
estimates I obtain suggest that the market for law school students
"behaves" in a manner that economists would consider quite rational, from
the perspective of the participants.
I turn in section III to an examination of recent data on law school
graduates' salaries, earnings in alternative occupations and law school
tuitions. These data suggest that while tuition increases have outpaced
starting salaries for lawyers, law school attendance, on average, still
appears to be a worthwhile investment.
Of course to say, on average, law school is a worthwhile investment
does not imply it will be equally profitable for all individuals nor that
4the costs will not influence career choices. High tuition and subsequent
high debt levels may discourage students from low-income families from
entering law school. High debt levels may also discourage law students
from entering low paying fields of practice (e.g., public interest law)
and many people may judge it to be socially desirable to expand employment
in these areas. This leads naturally to a discussion of how law schools
should allocate the limited financial aid resources they have and whether
these funds should be allocated in the form of loans or scholarships.
Section IV discusses these questions, borrowing heavily from earlier work
of mine.11 A brief final section then provides some concluding remarks.
II. The Market for Law School Students
Given the general market conditions that influence lawyers' salaries,
what factors might be expected to influence the starting salaries that
graduates of a law school receive? Other things equal, one would suspect
that the "better" the students and the "better" the law school the higher
starting salaries will be. The racial and gender mix of a school's
graduates may also influence starting salaries if discrimination or
affirmative action pressures are present in the legal labor market, or if
he "types" of law that graduates practice are influenced by their gender
and race. Finally, other things equal, starting salaries may differ for
graduates from public and private law schools because of differences in
the "types" of law that students from each tend to enter and/or due to
differences in placement efforts and recruitment networks that exist
between the two categories of schools.12
5Table 1 presents the results of my efforts to test some of these
hypotheses using data from Barron's Guide to Law Schools. Every few years
Barron's surveys the Deans of Admissions at American law schools to obtain
information for Barron's Guide to Law Schools. Among the questions asked
is the average starting salary of graduates of the prior years academic
class. Understandably, not all law schools wish to reveal this
information; however information for 99 of the 174 ABA accredited law
schools was reported in Barron's seventh edition, which was published in
1986. These data, which pertain to average starting salaries for
graduates of the law school class of 1985, are the salary data used in my
analyses.
Since these data come from admissions offices, not necessarily from
detailed records of placement offices, it is not obvious how accurate they
are. The National Association for Law Placement (NALP) annually collects
data on salaries of graduates of each law school, however the NALP data
for each individual law school j strictly confidential and could not be
used in this study.
To get a feel for the accuracy of the Barron's data, I provided a
representative of NALP with the Barron's salary data for three public and
three private law schools and asked her to compare them to the similar
data obtained by NALP in their survey of the class of 1985.13 She
reported that while Barron's average reported starting salary for the six
schools was $31,517, the comparable average in the NALP data was $32,997,
almost 4.7 percent, or $1,500, larger. In one case the NALP figure was
over $3,000 higher, while in another case it was almost $2,500 lower.
Reassuringly, though, the simple correlation of the Barron's and NALP
figures across the six schools was .951. Taken together, these results
suggest that the Barron's data are sufficiently accurate for my purposes
and they are used in Table 1.14
In this table, average starting salaries are specified to be a
function of the median LSAT score of enrolled students in the school (a
measure of student ability), the "Courman Score" of the law school in the
latest ranking (a measure of one observer's perceptions of the school's
"quality"), whether the school is a public institution, and the percentage
of the school's students that are females and minorities (column l).15
Equations are estimated using both the level and logarithm of average
salaries as dependent variables. Finally, some specifications (column 2)
include the percentage of the school's graduates placed in public sector
(government, military, or judicial clerkships), public service, and public
interest positions as an additional explanatory variable. While this
variable helps control for the "occupational distribution" of the school's
graduates, one must caution that it may well be determined by other
included variables in the model.
Focusing initially on the specification that ignores this last
variable (col. 1), as expected better students, as measured by LSAT
scores, received higher salaries. A one point increase in the average
LSAT score of students in a school was associated with about a $750 higher
average starting salary in 1985 in the level specification and a 2.5
percent higher stArting salary in the logarithmic specification.
Similarly, students from higher ranked (by Courman) schools received
higher salaries. So, for example, an increase in the Gournian ranking from
300 to 400 (the cutoff points for his "acceptable plus" and "strong"
7categories) was associated with a $1,500 higher 1985 average starting
salary in the level specification and about a 6 percent higher starting
salary in the logarithmic specification. Finally, other things equal,
graduates of public law schools' starting salaries were some $2,400, or
close to 9 percent lower in 1985 than graduates of private law schools and
the race and gender composition of a school's student body was unrelated
to its graduates' starting salaries.
Once one controls for the percentage of the law school's graduates
placed in public sector, public service or public interest positions (col.
2). the magnitude of these differentials changes somewhat. The salary
increase associated with a 100 point increase in the Gourman Score falls
to about $1,100 or 4 percent, while the public/private salary differential
falls to about $1,200, or 4.3 percent. Both of these reductions occur
because, other things equal, students from higher ranked law schools are
less likely, and students from public law schools are more likely to be
employed in public sector, public service, or public interest positions
(Table 2, panel A, col. l)).6
While the above results suggest that there are obvious economic
benefits (at least in terms of starting salaries) associated with
attending better rated law schools and private law schools, other things
equal, there are also obvious costs. These are documented in Table 3
where results are reported of estimating equations in which a law school's
1985-86 tuition and fees level for full-time students was specified to be
a function only of its Gourman Score and whether it is a public
institution.
8Focusing on the results for all schools (the top panel) a 100 point
increase in an institution's Gourman Score is associated with roughly a
$1,140 to $1,367 increase, or about a 20 percent higher tuition. Holding
school rating constant, tuition and fees average roughly $2,900 (for out-
of-state students) to $5,600 (for in-state students) lower at public that
private law schools, or 30.5 to 75.1 percent lower)-7 In fact, the same
percentage relationship between tuition and school rating is estimated
when analyses are done separately for private and public law schools (the
bottom two panels). Given this tuition/school rating relationships, it is
not surprising that there is also some evidence (Table 2, panel B) that
higher tuition levels reduce the proportion of students entering public
sector, public service and public interest law careers.
Why do the better rated law schools charge more? While one could
answer this question from the perspective of both the demand and cost
sides of the market. I focus initially on the cost side here. Analyses
are reported in Table 4 in which a law school's tuition and fees is
specified to be a function of the median base salary and fringe benefits
of its full-time faculty, the total number of volumes in its library per
first year student, the student-faculty ratio, and whether the school is
public. Presumably, one would expect that higher faculty salaries, a
higher library volume-student ratio, and a lower student-faculty ratio
should all be associated, other things equal, with higher tuition and fee
levels. In fact, of these three variables, only the faculty compensation
level seems to matter. In the logarithmic specification that uses out-of-
state tuition levels for public law schools, this variable's estimated
elasticity is not significantly different from unity. That is, across law
9schools at a point in time, as faculty compensation increases by a given
percentage, tuition and fees increase by roughly the same percentage.
Of course, from the perspective of the demand side of the market,
there may be a limit to what any law school can charge at a point in time;
raising tuition too far above one's competitors may lead to a decline in
applicants and/or acceptances from admitted applicants. Some evidence to
support this hypothesis, at least for private law schools is found in
Table 5 which presents the results of estimating equations in which a
school's acceDted apolicant yield (enrolled first-year students-accepted
applicants) and its aoolicant yield (enrolled first-year students-total
applicants) are specified to be functions of the Gourman Score of the
school and the logarithm of its tuition and fees for full-time students.
The coefficients of the latter variable can be interpreted as measuring
the effect of a one percent increase in a school's tuition and fees on the
two yield rates, school quality held equal.
Quite strikingly, higher tuition rates are associated with both lower
accepted applicant and lover applicant yield rates. When the analyses are
redone (middle panel) using only the sample of private schools, a ten
percent increase is a school's tuition is seen to reduce the school's
accepted applicant yield by about 2.3 percentage points and its applicant
yield by 1.4 percentage points. Not surprisingly, higher rated private
schools have higher accepted applicant yields (fewer accepted applicants
turn them down), but lower applicant yields (they have the luxury of
rejecting more applicants.)18
What emerges from these tables is a rather consistent pattern of
results. There are financial benefits, in the form of higher starting
10
salaries to attending higher rated law schools and, other things equal,
private law schools (Table 1). Because of this, higher rated law schools
and private law schools are able to charge higher tuitions (Table 3).
These higher tuitions allow them to pay higher faculty salaries (Table 4),
which presumably are used to attract and retain higher-quality faculty.
Given the rating of a law school, however, there is a limit to how high it
can raise its tuition, as higher tuition levels are associated with lower
accepted applicant yield rates (Table 5). Since the rating of a law
school surely depends heavily on the quality of its faculty, what emerges
from all this is a set of starting salary, law school rating.
public/private dichotomy-tuition-faculty salary relationships across law
schools that intuitively seems to make sense)-9
What has not yet been shown is, given the magnitudes of these
relationships, if law students appear on average to have made wise choices
in the law schools they attended. If on average, for a given Gourman
rating for a law school, graduates earned starting salaries that were
roughly $1,200 to $2,400 higher in 1985 if the law school was private
(Table 1), did it make sense for them to pay tuition and fees in the
private sector that were some $2,900 to $5,600 (Table 3) higher than
tuitions in public sector schools in 1985-86? If, other things equal, a
100 point increase in a law school's Gourman Score was associated with
increased starting salaries of 1,100 to $1,500, but increased tuition of
$1,140 to $1,370, did it make sense for them to try to attend the higher-
rated schools. The discussion that follows helps provide the answers.
Let T represent the tuition cost of attending a law school, C
represent other law school costs (including books and additional living
11
costs), A represent the opportunity cost of attending law school (the
earnings foregone), and S represent the earnings expected upon graduation
from law school. All these figures are expressed in annual terms and, for
expositional convenience I will ignore inflation, discounting, and growth
in any of these variables over time or over the life cycle here (these
restrictions are relaxed in section III).20 If the time it takes to
complete law school is L years and a law school graduate expects to
practice law for N years then it is straightforward to show that under
these assumptions the expected present value (PV) of the financial gain
from attending law school is
-
(1) PV — N(S - A) - L(T + C + A)
Now suppose that we consider two law schools, i and j, and that the
only elements in the above expression that differ between them are their
tuition levels and the expected earnings levels of their graduates. Then
the difference between the expected present values of financial gains from
attending the two schools is
(2) PVi - PVj —N(Sj - Sj) - L(Tj - Tj)
Suppose law school i's tuition is higher, as is the expected
earnings levels of its graduates. If individuals choose law schools based
on the expected financial gains they offer, school i will be preferred to
school J as long as PVj  PVj, which occurs if and only if
(3) (Si - Sj)  (L/N)(Tj-Tj)
12
Typically, completion of law school for full-time students requires
three years (L — 3) and it is not unreasonable to assume that a person who
graduates from law school plans to spend at least 15 years in the
profession (N - 15). Thus, it makes sense for the typical student to try
to attend the high tuition level law school as long as the annual earnings
advantage of its graduates over the graduates of the low tuition level
school (Si - 59 is at least 20 percent (3/15) of its annual tuicion cost
disadvantage (T - Tj).
Given this relationship, it is clear the potential law school
students had an incentive (at least in 1985) to get to the highest rated
school they could. The marginal annual tuition cost of attending a higher
rated school was roughly of the same order of magnitude as the marginal
gain in annual earnings the higher rated school provided. Similarly,
potential law school students on average had an incentive to attend
private sector law schools rather than public law schools of equal rating;
the lower estimate of the estimated annual salary gain from doing so
($1,200) exceeds 20 percent of our estimate of the average tuition
differential for in-state students of doing so ($5,600).
Of course to say that it made sense on average for students to try to
attend highly rated private law schools in 1985-86 doesn't imply that it
made sense for all individuals to try to do so. Individuals who expected
to practice law only for a relatively short period of time obviously would
find the net financial advantage from public law schools higher.
Individuals who expected little financial gain from attending higher rated
private law schools (such as those interested in public interest law)
would obviously not have sought to do so. It is thus not surprising that
13
I found graduates from higher rated law schools and private law schools
were less likely to be employed in public sector, public service, or
public interest positions (Table 2).
Given the financial incentives prospective students faced in 1985-86.
it is also not surprising that the decline in the number and quality of
law school applicants observed in the 1980s has been felt primarily by the
lower ranked law schools.21 In a sense, the higher ranked private schools
had a "captive" audience. One may wonder then, why these schools did not
try to "confiscate" some of the benefits students received from attending
them by increasing tuitions above their then-current levels. Part of the
answer is that annual and/or lifetime borrowing limits that students faced
under federal programs may have limited the schools' ability to do so.22
One should also note that, other things held constant, equal percentage
tuition increases at higher rated and lower rated private institutions, or
at private and public schools over time, would widen the absolute tuition
level differential between the two groups of institutions. Unless the
absolute earnings advantage the higher tuition schools provided their
students also widened, they would find fewer students willing to enroll in
them. Highly rated private schools are not immune to market pressures.
III. Has Law School Attendance Become Less Attractive Financially in
Recent Years?
The previous section addressed issues relating to the market for law
students at a point in time; here I consider what has happened to that
market over time. In particular, I examine whether rising law school
tuition levels, coupled with changing earnings levels in law and other
14
occupations, have decreased the relative financial attractiveness of law
as a career.
Historical data on the salaries earned by new lawyers are hard to
come by. For the last 13 years, however, Student Lawyer has published
starting salaries for lawyers in law firms and corporations in a number of
cities; the 1987 survey covered 18 cities.23 The Student Lawyer salary
data are easily accessible and because they go back to the mid-70s I use
them in my analyses below, focusing on the salaries paid by nonpatent law
firms.
Although law firms are the major employers of new lawyers, a
substantial minority of lawyers enter corporate practice, government
careers, judicial clerkships, public interest practices, or academic
careers. Starting salaries in the latter four categories tend to be lower
than those for law firms. For example, while the average starting salary
of graduates of the law school class of 1986 was $32,752 nationwide, the
average starting salary for lawyers entering private practice was $36,050,
for lawyers in business and industry $34,512, for government lawyers
$26,659, for lawyers in judicial clerkships $24,416, for lawyers in public
interest practices $21,792. and for academic lawyers $28,852.24 Thus the
use of law firm salary figures will overstate the average starting
salaries of all new lawyers at a point in time. On the other hand, over
the 1974-86 period, the percentage of law school graduates entering
private practice has risen from 52.2 to 61.6 and the percentage entering
government (including military) judicial clerkships, public interest, and
academic law has fallen from 35.5 to 30.7.25 Focusing on the salaries of
lawyers entering private practice may thus well understate the trend
15
increase in the average law school graduate starting salary over the
period.
Table 6 takes the Student Lawyer starting salary data for seven
cities for whom data has been published continuously since 1976 and asks
how these salary figures for each city compare to the tuition and fees
charged by a law school in the same city. Of course, not all graduates of
a law school practice law in the city in which the school is located nor
do all new lawyers in a city come from law schools in that city.
Nonetheless, these data provide initial suggestive evidence on the
financial benefits and costs of attending law schools. In the main, the
law schools I have chosen for each city are relatively high-priced private
law schools, although one public institution is included.
Panel A presents the ratio of each law school's tuition in a year to
the average annual starting salary of starting lawyers in nonpatent law
firms in the city during the 1975-76 to 1985-86 period. Harvard's tuition
is used for Boston and during the period the ratio in Boston rose from .22
to .34; a 50 percent increase. Increases of similar magnitudes were
observed for NYU (New York). Georgetown (Washington) and Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia). Somewhat smaller increases were recorded for Chicago
(Chicago) and Marquette (Milwaukee), while nonresident law school tuition
in the one public university in the sample. UCLA, actually remained
relatively stable, as a fraction of starting salaries in the city (Los
Angeles), during the period.
To the casual observer, the rapid rise in these ratios for the elite
private law schools may suggest they are in danger of pricing themselves
"out of the market". However, as should be clear from equation (1),
16
ratios can be deceiving. What is relevant is not the ratio of tuition and
fees to starting salaries but rather the difference between the two
variables in terms. That is, after controlling for changes in the
price level, what is relevant is how the difference between annual
starting salaries and annual law school tuition and fees has moved.
Panel B of Table 6 presents the answer to this question. For some
law schools (Chicago and UCLA), the difference has actually increased.
For the others, the difference has decreased. However, save for
Georgetown, the decrease was relatively small (less than 10%), so the
decline in the attractiveness of attendance at law schools (if it occurred
at all) was not as large as the ratio comparisons in panel A suggest.
In fact, even the comparisons in panel B are misleading and do not
give the reader an accurate picture of the changes that have occurred in
the financial attractiveness of pursuing a career in law. To see this,
refer to equation (1), which showed the expected present value of the
financial gain from attending law school. If one first differences this
equation one obtains
(4) PV—N(S-A) -L(T+C+M).
where the symbol indicates the change that occurs between two years in
a variable in terms (holding prices constant). The change in
expected present value is seen in (4) to depend on the change in lawyers'
starting sa1aries (AS), the change in starting salaries in other
occupations (LA), the change in law school tuition and fees (AT), and the
change in other law school costs (AC). This equation makes clear that the
calculations in Table 6 ignore what is happening to earnings in other
17
occupations law students might enter. It also implies that equal dollar
increases in starting lawyer salaries and in law school tuition and fees
actually increase the relative financial attractiveness of entering the
legal profession. The latter occurs because the number of years
individuals plan on practicing law (N) is considerably longer than the
length of time it takes to complete law school (L).
If one is willing to assume that changes in other law school costs
(books and additional living costs) have been small in real terms, one can
ignore them and compute whether the financial attractiveness of attending
law school has changed during a time period from
(5) PV — N(S - A) - L(T + M)
If the expression in (5) is positive, the financial attractiveness has
increased during the period, while if the expression is negative,
attractiveness has declined.
To make such computations requires one to have data on expected
earnings in law, on expected earnings in alternative occupations, and on
law school tuition costs. Some illustrative data that can be used at the
national level are found in Table 7 for the 1974-75 to 1986-87 period.
For lawyers' expected earnings (LSAL), I have constructed an
unweighted average (across the seven cities listed in Table 6) of the
starting salaries of lawyers in nonpatent law firms from the annual
Student Lawyer surveys. While the focus on lawyers in private practice
(see footnote 24) and limitation to lawyers employed in large cities may
cause this average to overstate the true average starting salary of
18
lawyers,for the two years that NALP has published average nationwide
starting salary data from their annual survey, their averages and mine are
not too far off.26
Data on annual starting salaries in other occupations prospective law
students might enter come from the College Placement Council.27 One
option prospective law students have is to attend business school, the
relevant comparison salaries I have used to capture this option are the
average annual starting salaries of MBA graduates who had nontechnical
(ASAL1) and technical (ASAL5) undergraduate degrees. Another option is to
find employment directly Out of college; the comparison salaries I have
used for this are those for college graduates who majored in the
humanities (ASAL2), other social sciences (ASAL3), and economics (ASAL4).
Finally, the table reports average private and public law school tuitions
(TPRV, TPUB) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The calculations that
follow all set the price index in 1975 equal to 1.00 and deflate the
dollar values of all variables in each subsequent year by the relative
price index in that year so that all variables are expressed in real
terms.
While one cannot derive conclusions about the expected financial gain
from attending law school simply by focusing on the starting salaries of
lawyers relative to the salaries in the alternative occupations
prospective lawyers might enter, such comparisons are instructive and are
found in Table 8.28 Although lawyers' starting salaries declined relative
to those of MBA students between the class of 1975 and the class of 1983,
from 1983 to 1987, the relative starting salary of lawyers rose by over 20
percent (Ri, P5). Similarly, while substantial declines occurred in the
19
starting salaries of lawyers vis-a-vis college graduates with humanities
CR2), other social sciences CR3) and economics (R4) degrees through 1983.
by 1987, lawyers' relative starting salaries had returned to their 1975
levels. At least in recent years, lawyers' earnings have grown at higher
rates than earnings in alternative occupations that prospective law
students might enter.
More formal calculations about how the expected present value of a
law school degree has changed relative to the expected present value of
alternative degrees are presented in Table 9. These calculations use
equation (5) and make use of the average private law school tuition,
rather than the average public law school tuition. Since changes in the
former have been much greater (in real terms), this will bias the findings
against finding law school attendance increasing in attractiveness. They
also assume an expected work life (N) of 15 years (to be conservative) and
that law school completion (L) takes an extra three years when the
comparison group is college graduates, but only an extra one year when the
alternative is getting an MBA degree.29
Table 9 suggests that while the financial attractiveness of a law
degree fell relative to that of an MBA degree throughout most of the 1975-
76 to 1982-83 period, it actually has risen in more recent years.
Moreover, throughout the 1975-76 to 1986-87 period, the financial
attractiveness of a law degree has risen relative to the financial
attractiveness of entering the labor market directly upon college
completion. Taken at face value, these results suggest that the practice
of law remains, and probably is becoming increasingly, a financially
attractive career and they may help to explain the slight increase in law
20
school applicants observed in 1986-87 and the dramatic increase observed
in the 1987-88 academic year.3°
Of course, these conclusions all are derived from expected present
value calculations that made a number of very stringent simplifying
assumptions. In particular, they ignore inflation, discounting (or the
costs of borrowing funds), and real growth in lawyers, earnings and the
earnings in other occupations over individuals' life cycles. While it is
difficult to obtain occupation specific life-cycle earnings growth figures
based upon longitudinal data, the limited data that are available for
lawyers suggests that lawyers' earnings grow at least initially at rates
that far exceed likely rates of discount.
To illustrate this, Table 10 presents average salary data for lawyers
employed in nonpatent law firms for eight cities for five years. These
data, which come from Student Lawyers annual salary surveys, allow us to
trace the earnings of young lawyers during the early years of their
careers. So for example, the average starting salary for lawyers in
Boston in 1982 was $24,000. With a year's experience in 1983, these
lawyers would be earning $27,000 on average and a year later, with two
year's experience they would be earning $34,000 on average. More
generally, to trace the earnings history of a typical lawyer employed by
these firms over time, one moves diagonally downward to the right in the
table.
Focusing on workers who were first employed in 1982 in each city, I
have underlined in the table the salaries they earned on average each year
through 1986. Quite strikingly, over the five-year period, their nominal
salaries at least doubled in four of the six cities and in the other two.
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Atlanta and Washington, their earnings increased by over 80 percent. For
earnings in 1986 discounted back to 1982 to be worth more in real
terms than earnings in 1982, the discount rate would have to be at least
15.8 percent for the latter two cities and over 18.9 percent for all the
other cities.31 Given the rate of inflation that prevailed during the
period, it is highly unlikely that discount rates could be that high. The
rates of interest charged on federal educational loans were much lower
during the period.32
Of course, not all lawyers who start in average paying firms maintain
their employment in these firms for four years. Of those who do, some
fail to make partnerships after six years and many of these wind up in
lower paying positions or in self-employment. On the other hand, those
who do reach partner status do appreciably better financially. For
example, across the 18 cities that Student Lawyer surveyed in 1986 the
average salaries of partners in nonpatent law firms was 465 percent of the
average starting salaries of new lawyers in these same firms.33 While in
the absence of data on life-cycle earnings growth rates in other
occupations one cannot draw definitive conclusions, in recent years
entering law school, on average, still seems like a good investment. As
emphasized by Kramer, the real issue is whether limitations on the annual
and total amounts of funds prospective law students can borrow, and
restrictions on the length of the period over which they must repay the
loans, will constrain students borrowing and hence law schools' future
ability to raise tuitions.34
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IV. Optimal Financial Aid Policies for Selective Law Schools
To say that on average law school is a worthwhile investment, is not
to say that the investment will be equally profitable for all individuals
nor is it to say that law school costs will not influence individuals'
career choices. High tuition levels and subsequent high debt levels may
discourage students from low-income families from entering law schools.
High debt levels, along with growing differentials between high-paying
(e.g. private practice) and low-paying (e.g. , public interest) fields of
law may discourage students from entering the latter.35
Of course, both law schools and applicants to law schools behave
selectively. Law schools select who they will admit; in a recent year
over half of ABA-accredited law schools reported admitting less than 50
percent of their applicants, while almost one-tenth reported admitting
less than 25 percent of their applicants.36 Accepted applicants in turn
select from the schools at which they have been admitted,arid decide
whether and where to enroll. Indeed, the fraction of accepted applicants
who actually enroll is less than 50 percent in over three quarters of all
ABA-accredited law schools.37
Law schools obviously believe that targeting financial aid to bright,
needy, or minority students will influence these students' decisions to
enroll, as substantial resources are devoted to "merit", "needs-based", or
"minority" scholarships.38 Similarly, law schools obviously believe that
"loan-forgiveness" programs for law students who enter "low-income"
careers (such as public interest law) can either help them attract
students with such interests and/or influence existing students career
choices.39 Do such strategies make sense? More generally, if a law
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school wants to optimally allocate its financial aid resources, what
strategies should it pursue?
To answer such questions requires one to be a bit more precise about
what law schools are trying to accomplish and to specify the constraints
that they face. Elsewhere, I have formally addressed the issue of
"optimal financial aid policies" for selective undergraduate colleges and
I adapt my previous discussion to law school financial aid policies
below.40 As I shall show, the design of financial aid policies is not as
simple as one might think.
Suppose that a selective law school faces K different categories of
applicants. These categories may depend upon applicants' minority status,
their socioeconomic backgrounds, their academic abilities, whether their
parents are alumni, the types of law the applicants claim to be interested
in pursuing or any other attributes the law school cares about. To take
an example, if the law school cares only about its applicants' minority
status, whether they came from low-income families, or whether they scored
above a certain threshold on the LSAT exam, there would be eight
categories of applicants (yes/yes/yes, yes/yes,no, yes/no/no, ...). Let
Xj denote the number of applicants from category i that a school admits.
Suppose next that the law school establishes a tuition and fees level
that does not vary across categories of students but that it varies its
financial aid policy so that the share of tuition and fees subsidized in
the form of financial aid (ar) varies across groups. Determining how this
share should vary is our objective.
Given the school's tuition and fees level, the proportion of accepted
applicants from each category that actually enroll (Ft), its acceDted
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applicant yield, is inversely related to the share of the category's
tuition and fees that is subsidized
(6) Fi—Fi(ai)
Increased financial aid increases the likelihood that accepted applicants
will enroll. Quite crucially, the sensitivity of applicants, enrollment
decisions to financial aid may well ygy across groups. Note also that it
is assumed that when aid is zero, some fraction (poasibly zero) of
accepted applicants from a group will enroll. This fraction, the group's
propensity to enroll, may also differ across groups.
Why does a law school care about its accepted applicant yield? The
product of the number of admitted applicants in a group and the group's
yield is the number of students from the group who actually enroll. If
the yield falls, a law school could always admit more applicants from the
group to get the same number of enrolled students. The cost of doing
this, however, is that the "deeper" the school dips into a group's
applicant pool, the lower the average quality (as measured say by LSAT
scores) of enrolled students in the group (q) is likely to be
(7) q — qj(X).
Crucially, how sensitive applicant quality is to the number of applicants
admitted may also differ across groups. For example, the average quality
of minority applicants may fall off much more rapidly with the number
admitted than does the average quality of white male applicants.
Suppose the law school values the total "quality units" of students
who actually enroll in each category (Ei — F(aj)q(X)X) and that the
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weights it places on attracting students from different categories can be
summarized by a utility or welfare function of the form
(8) U - U(E1,E2, ... E).
Note that this formulation distinguishes between the objective
academic aualitv of applicants and their subjective relative
attractiveness to the law school. The former depends on measurable
academic attributes. The latter, however, depends on the law school's
subjective valuations of applicant characteristics (such as minority
status and family socioeconomic background) that are summarized by
equation (8). Category i applicants are defined as being relatively
attractive to the law school than category j applicants if, when the
school has enrolled the same number of quality units of applicants from
both categories, it would get greater marginal utility from enrolling an
additional quality unit of students from category i than from category j.
Given a fixed budget that the law school wants to commit to financial
aid, suppose that it seeks to maximize its utility function subject to the
constraints imposed by its accepted applicant yield and average quality
functions. Under suitable assumptions about the shapes of the various
functions, one can show that its financial aid policies should depend upon
four factors.4'
First, other things equal, applicant groups that are relatively more
attractive should receive more aid. Second, other things equal, groups
with lower propensities to enroll if admitted should receive more aid,
there is no reason to subsidize groups that would enroll even in the
absence of aid. Third, other things equal, the more sensitive a group's
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enrollment decisions are to financial aid, the more aid they should
receive. Finally, other things equal, the more sensitive a category's
average quality is to the number of applicants admitted, the greater the
aid that category should receive.42 While the relative attractiveness
of different categories of applicants must be subjectively determined by a
law school, the other "parameters" it needs to know (groups' propensities
to enroll, sensitivities of yield to financial aid, sensitivities of
average qualities to numbers admitted) are all objectively determined and
can be estimated by institutionally-based empirical studies.43
These findings have a number of implications for the financial aid
policies law schools should pursue. Law schools may want to attract the
brightest possible students to help increase their perceived ratings.44
They may also feel it socially desirable to increase the number of lawyers
coming from low-income and minority backgrounds. Other things equal,
groups that are relatively more attractive optimally should receive more
aid; this seems to argue in favor of financial aid being merit-based.
need-based, and more generous for minorities. However, other things are
necessarily equal, propensities to enroll, sensitivities of yield to
aid, and sensitivities of enrolled student quality to the number admitted
may also differ across groups. While sometimes these other factors may
reenforce aid decisions based solely on the "relative attractiveness"
criteria, they need not always and these other factors should enter into
aid decisions.45
Law schools may also want to influence the distribution of their
graduating students across types of practices. In particular, they may
want to encourage people to enter public interest law or to practice law
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in low-income areas where legal representation is scarce. Other things
equal, to the extent that they judge students interested in these types of
practice relatively more attractive, such students should receive higher
aid levels.
Of course, announced intent to pursue a certain type of legal career
does not mean students will actually wind up in such a career. Hence,
contingent loan forgiveness programs that are announced prior to students
enrolling in law school appear to make more sense than does direct
scholarship aid for these students. Decisions about allocation of
resources to grant aid and to loan forgiveness programs must therefore be
made together. Shifting up front scholarship money into loan forgiveness
programs, as some have people have suggested, may well make sense.
Eligibility for existing loan forgiveness programs at some law
schools is based on law school graduates' earnings after they leave law
school, as well as on the type of law practices they enter. However, in
other schools, eligibility is based solely on the graduates' earnings.46
The latter type of programs provide a form of insurance for those people
who enter types of practice that, on average, are lucrative but who fail
to do well financially. It is not obvious that law schools should provide
this type of insurance for their students.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper has consisted of four interrelated sections. The first
summarized the lessons we have learned from prior empirical research about
the market for law students. The second conducted an empirical analysis
of how this market functions at a point in time, using law schools as the
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units of analysis, and concluded that it behaves in a manner that
economists would consider quite rational. The third examined recent data
on law school tuition levels, starting lawyers' earnings, and earnings in
other occupations and concluded that, on average, law school still appears
to be a worthwhile investment. The last sketched a model of how law
schools should allocate their limited financial aid resources, indicated
the types of information law schools need to intelligently make such
decisions, and traced the implications of the model for financial aid
policies.
Together, these sections should stress to the reader how useful
rather simple economic models and empirical analyses can be in improving
our understanding of how the market for law students operates. Moreover,
empirical analyses of this market have only begun. If ways could be found
to grant researchers access to the annual NALP surveys of salaries of law
school graduates for individual law school's, the analyses I presented in
section II could be considerably expanded and improved upon. For example,
studies could be done of the determinants of starting salaries that more
fully control for the race and gender composition of a school's graduates,
as well as the types of practices they enter and the geographic areas in
which they reside.
One could also analyze the extent to which starting salaries of
graduates vary for each jaw school and then study whether such variability
influences law school applicants' decisions. One reasonable conjecture is
that potential students will be more attracted to law schools that offer
them (upon graduation) hjg expected starting salaries to those that
offer them a greater certainty (that is J variability of starting
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salaries) of what they will likely face at the end of their studies. It
may well be the case that the better law schools offer potential students
both higher expected starting salaries and greater certainty.47
While we can infer something about age-earnings profiles for lawyers
who remain with the same law firm over time (Table 10), we actually have
very little information on the career earnings profiles of most lawyers in
the United States. Serious longitudinal data collection efforts by NALP
or some other organization that follow a cohort of lawyers over time,
would clearly also be worthwhile. Finally, if law schools are to
"optimally" allocate financial aid among categories of recipients, section
IV indicates that they must conduct institutionally-based empirical
studies to ascertain the magnitudes of various parameters.
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Footnotes
1. See, for example, Richard Freeman (1975), Peter Pashigian (1977)
and Aloysius Siow (1984).
2. For the U.S. studies, see footnote 1. The studies that use
Canadian data include David Stager and David Foot (1987a) (1987b) (forthcoming
3. See Pashigian (1977).
4. See David Vernon and Bruce Zimmer (1987). There was a slight
upturn in the number of applicants in 1986 and then a much larger increase
in 1987.
5. See, for example, David Stager (forthcoming), Stager and Foot
(1987a) (l987b) (forthcoming), and Burton Weisbrod (1983).
6. See Burton Weisbrod (1983). John Goddeeris (1988) has recently
reanalyzed the data Weisbrod used and found that once one accounts for
several statistical problems (more formally, self-selection bias and
choice-based sampling), one fails to find that public interest lawyers are
earning substantially less than they would have earned in alternative
types of practices.
7. See Stephen Spurr (1987).
8. See Spurr (1987) and National Association for Law Placement
(l987a).
9. For studies of undergraduate student debt, see Janet Hansen
(1987). W. Lee Hansen and Marilyn Rhodes (1987) (forthcoming) and Michael
McPherson and Mary S. Skinner (1986). For studies of law, graduate and
professional student debt, see Terry Hartle and Richard Wabick (1983) and
John Kramer (1987).
10. See Kramer (1987).
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11. See Ronald Ehrenberg and Daniel Sherman (1984). A related piece
is Stephen Hoenack (1971).
12. There are, of course, many other factors that influence a
school's starting salaries, including the specific geographic areas in
which the school's graduates tend to be employed. In the absence of such
data, I ignore these other factors here.
13. I appreciate the assistance of Jane Thieberger, Chair of the
NALP Research Committee, in making these calculations.
14. Since the NALP data contain a host of other information,
including (see footnote 12) detailed area of employment information, it
clearly would have been preferable to use them.
15. The Gourman Score comes from The Gourtugn Reoort which is claimed
by the author to be an objective evaluation based on a wide number of
criteria. No details are provided by Gourman on precisely how these
scores are calculated. Many people connected with legal education have
questioned Courman's methods and consider his ratings to be unreliable.
David Webster (1984) details similar concerns about Gourman's analogous
rankings of undergraduate colleges.
Since other rankings do not always agree with Gourman, it would be
desirable to redo the analysis below using other rankings. It is
interesting to note, however, that the correlation between the rankings of
the top 20 law schools ranked by Deans of law schools in a recent iLL.
News and World ReDort article and the rankings of the same scores in the
Opurman ReDort is about .85. Hence, the Gourman Scores may be
sufficiently accurate for my purposes. (An earlier study of college
graduates (Lewis Solomon (1973)) found that their earnings were
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significantly related to the analogous Gourman rankings of their
undergraduate institutions.)
The actual Gourman Scores of accredited law schools in the Gourman
Reoort range from 2.10 to 4.95. I ignored the decimal points in my
analyses and thus will act as if the scores range from 210 to 495.
Finally, it is worth stressing that the Gourman and other rankings of
law schools would find it near impossible to get sufficient information to
actually measure the quality of legal education that any law school
provides. At best what they measure is the quality of inputs used in the
educational process (e.g., student quality, faculty quality, library size)
or subjective impressions of a law school's reputation. My goal is to see
if the legal labor market appears to reward attendance at "high quality"
institutions, as measured by such rankings.
16. Note that once public sector, public service, and public
interest law employment is controlled for, minorities are seen to receive
significantly higher job offers than nonminorities (some $11,000 or 30
percent higher). Thus, affirmative action pressures do seem important in
the legal labor market.
17. These are computed, respectively, by ((exp(- .50l))-1)*lOO and
((exp(_l.390))_l)*100.
18. As the bottom panel of Table 5 indicates, no such relationships
are found when the analyses are restricted to public law schools.
19. What is missing from this "picture" is an explanation of why
some law schools locate at the high rating-high cost end and others at the
low rating-low cost end of the market. Is it due to differences in law
school endowments, to the general status of the university a law school is
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attached to, or to unique historical factors? An analysis of this issue
is far beyond the scope of this paper.
20. Implicitly, I am assuming here that starting salary
differentials across schools persist over graduates' lifetimes. If
earnings of graduates from higher rated schools tend to grow at a more
rapid (slower) rate, this will increase (decrease) the financial
attractiveness of attendance at these schools. Some evidence suggesting
that such differentials may decrease over time, as the 'true ability" of
individual lawyers is observed, is presented in Spurr (1987).
21. Vernon and Zimmer (1987).
22. Kramer (1987).
23. The 1987 survey, covering the class of 1987, was conducted by
the Chicago-based legal placement firm David J. White and Associates (as
were many of the earlier surveys) during the March to May 1987 period.
The published results were based on a survey of 8,000 law firms (with a
27.5% response rate) and on salary information from positions listed with
David J. White and Associates.
24. NALP (l987a).
25. NALP (1987b).
26. Average starting salaries of NALP respondents in their surveys
of the classes of 1985 and 1986 were 29,124 and 32,757 respectively (see
NALP (1987c) (1987a). If we take these figures as the "true" averages,
the computed LSAL variable is off by 11.4% for the class of 1985 and 4.4%
for the class of 1986. Prior to 1985, NALP did not report national
average salary information. While such figures could be calculated in
principle from the detailed data they report, such an effort is beyond the
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scope of this paper.
Typically starting lawyers in the federal government are hired at the
CS-li grade. In the fall of 1975 this grade's salary level was slightly
greater than the 1975 estimated LSAL value of $15,688. By the fall of
1987, the CS-Il salary had grown to slightly over $27,000 but LSAL had
risen to almost $37,000. This dramatic decline in the ratio of government
to private sector starting lawyers. salaries undoubtedly helps to explain
the declining proportion of new lawyers entering government service.
27. College Placement Council (1985) (1986) (1987).
28. I must again caution that equations (1) and (5) indicate that
the differences in salaries, not the ratios, are what determines expected
financial gain.
29. A hidden assumption in the comparison of law schools and
business schools is that tuition levels for given quality schools of each
type are equal.
30. Vernon and Zimmer (1987), Table 1 and New York Times (1988).
31. The discount rates reported in the text are the solutions to the
equations (1.8) — (1-fr)4 and (2.0) — (l+r)4.
32. See Pyle and Kramer (1984) and Kramer (1987).
33. Law School Admission Service (1987), pp. 25-31. On the other
hand, these rates did tend to increase over the period and such increases
would, other things held constant, tend to decrease the financial return
from investing in a legal education.
34. See Kramer (1987).
35. See Tamar Lewin (1987).
36. See Baron's (1986).
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37. See Barron's (1986).
38. In academic year 1986-87 private law schools' grants to students
averaged 10.5 percent of tuition and fees, while public law schools'
grants averaged 17.4 percent (ABA Memorandum QS8687-37, "Overview of
Scholarship Programs for 174 ABA-Approved Law Schools", March 17, 1987).
39. See Lynn Miller (1987). As of the fall of 1987, 13 of the 175
ABA-accredited law schools had some form of loan forgiveness program.
Annual income eligibility cut-offs for these programs ranged from $26,000
(at Pennsylvania) to $40,000 (at Yale) and eligibility under these
programs began as early as the first year after law school (Harvard) and
as late as six years after (Cornell).
40. See Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984).
41. See Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) for formal proofs.
42. More formally, sensitivity is defined here as the percentage
decline in applicant quality that occurs in response to a given percentage
increase in the number of applicants. The intuition behind this last
result can be illustrated by an example. Suppose that the quality of
minority applicants to a law school falls off rapidly with the number
admitted but that it has a large number of fairly indistinguishable white
male applicants. It should, other things equal. give more aid to the
former as keeping their yield high will avoid the need to admit
substantially less qualified applicants. While it is true that giving
less aid to the latter will decrease their yield, admitting more of them
will not substantially reduce the average quality of enrollees from the
group.
43. See F.hrenberg and Sherman (1984) for details.
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44. Recall from section II that higher rated schools can charge
higher tuition levels.
45. Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) examined data on undergraduates at
one selective university and showed that all of the factors argued in
favor of an undergraduate financial aid policy at that university that
provided larger scholarships for minorities and high-ability students.
46. These statements are based on Miller (1987) and conversations
with administrators at a number of law schools. Several of the latter
were kind enough to provide me with copies of their school's formal
program documents.
47. I am grateful to Dean Peter Martin of the Cornell Law School for
suggesting this point to me.
Table 1
Average Starting Salary Equations: Law School's Class of 1985
(absolute value t statistics)
SAL LSAL
(1) (2) (1) (2)
LSAT
GOR
PUB
791
MIN
PS
Constant
736.289
15.027
—2399.517
—62.913
68.789
—1895.394
(4.9)*
(2.1)*
(3.5)5
(0.9)
(1.6)
(0.4)
576.871
11.404
—1178.186
—27.879
111.630
—230.675
8812.298
(4.4)*
(2.0)*
(2.0)
(0.5)
(3.1)
(6.2)*
(2.4)
.0259
.0006
—.0867
—.0004
.0014
9.1236
( 4.3)*
( 2.1)*
( 3.3)
C 0.2)
( 0.9)
(59.8)
.0201
.0004
—.0435
.0007
.0031
—.0086
9.5054
( 3.9)*
C 1.8)
( 1.9)
( 0.2)
C 2.2)*
( 5•9)*
(66.2)
2 .483 .605 .449 .572
n 99 98 99 98
*Coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at
two—tail test.
the .05 level;
where SAL — average starting salary of graduates of the law school
LSAL — logarithm of average starting salary of graduates of the law school
LSAT — median LSAT score of enrolled students in the law school
GOR — "Gourman Score" of law school in latest ranking multiplied by 100
(range goes from 210 to 495)
PUB — 1—public institution 0—private institution
FEN — percentage of school's students that are females
MIN — percentage of school's students that are minorities
PS — percentage of achool's graduates placed in public Sector (government,
military or judicial clerkships), public service and public
interest positions
Source: 1) Barron's Guide to Law Schools: Seventh Edition (Hauppage, NY:
Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1986) — SAL, LSAL, LSAT, PEN,
Ilin. PS.
3) Meerican Bar Association, Memorandum QS8687—37, March 17, 1987 — PUB.
2) The Gourman Report: A Rating of Graduate and Professional Programs
in Anerican and International Universities, Third Edition Revised
(Los Angeles, CA: National Education Standards, 1983) — GOR.
Table 2
Percentage of Students Entering Public Sector.
Public Service, and Public Interest Law
(absolute value t statistic)
All Law Schools Public
(3)
Private
(4)A. (1) (2)
LSAT .097 (0.3) .186 (0.6) .270 (0.6) —.009 (0.0)
GOP. —.027 (1.9) —.030 (2.0)* —.043 (2.1)* —.013 (0.6)
F( .177 (1.3) .145 (1.0) .116 (0.5) .235 (1.3)
MIN .183 (2.0)* .193 (2.1)* .016 (0.1) .258 (2.2)*
PUB 3.244 (2.2)*
Constant 21.490 (2.6)* 21.749 (2.6)* 28.226 (2.4)* 17.430 (1.5)
2 .080 .055 .037 .084
n 147 147 64 83
B. (1) (2) (3) (4)
YEM .052 (0.4) .062 (0.4) —.214 (1.0) .236 (1.4)
MIN .310 (3.9)* .309 (3.9)* .348 (3.0)* .255 (2.3)
0
—.001 (1.8) —.001 (2.9)* —.000 (1.0) —.001 (1.2)
PUB 1.176 (0.6)
Constant 25.265 (0.6) 26.578 (5.3)* 36.636 (4.7)* 17.404 (2.4)*
2 .137 .141 .132 .098
n 153 153 67 86
*Coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the .05
level, two—tail test.
where
o — Tuition and fees for full—time students, out—of—state students' figures
used for public schools.
Table 3
The Relationship Between 1985—86 Law School Tuition and Fees
and the Gourman Score of the School
(absolute value t statistics)
Logarithm of
i.ition and Fees
(0) (I)(I)
All Schools (n..172)
GOR 13.673 (l0.5)* 11.411 (10.5)* .002 ( 8.7)* .002 ( 5.9)*
PUB
—2892.148 (14.0)* —5606.822 (29.6)* —.501 (13.0)* —1.390 (29.0)*
Constant 2981.088 ( 6.4)*
.643
3751.106
.850
( 8.8)* 8.186
.589
(94.5)* 8.298
.836
(77.0)*
Private Schools (n—99)
.002 C 8.6)*GOR 16.848 (10.6)*
Constant 1901.042 ( 3•4)*
.530
8.185
.196
(94.8)*
Public Schools (n.73)
GOR 8.915 ( 4.3) 3.259 ( 2.5)* .002 ( 4.0)* .001 C 2.0)*
Constant 1701.256 C 2.3)*
.193
906.121
.065
C 2.0)* 7.868
.206
(46.3)* 7.076
.041
(31.5)*
*Coefficient statistically significant from zero
where 0 — Tuition and Fees, for full—time students, out—of—state students'
figures used for public law schools
I — Tuition and Fees for full—time students, in—state students' figures
used for public law schools
at .05 level, two—tail test.
Source: Barron's Guide to Law Schools: Seventh Edition (Hauppage, NY:
Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1986) — 0, I.
Tuition and Fees
(0)
Table 4
1985—86 Law School Tuition and Fee Equations
(absolute value t statistics)
Logarithm of
Tuition and Fees
(0).- (I) (I)
All Schools (n..158)
COMP .086 (10.6)* .066 ( 8.8)*
LIBSTU —218.010 ( 1.2) —21.584 ( 0.1) —.069 ( 1.9) —.042 ( 0.8)
STUFAC —34.410 ( 1.3) —44.912 ( 1.9) —.003 ( 0.6) —.008 ( 1.2)
PUB —3005.827 (14.1)* —5738.228 (28.9)* —.511 (12.2)* —1.422 (25.7)*
LCOMP 1.025 ( 9.0) .647 ( 4•3)*
Constant 2639.019 ( 3.6)
.689
3990.174
.867
( 5.8)* —2.347
.627
( 1.9) 1.915
.830
( 1.2)
Private Schools (n86)
COMP .108 (1O.5)*
LIBSTU —233.298 C 1.0) —.058 ( 1.5)
STUFAC —4.057 ( 0.1) .000 C 0.0)
LCOMP .986 ( 8.1)*
Constant 635.695 ( 0.6)
.592
—1.984
.442
C 1.5)
Public Schools (n72)
COMP .055 ( 3.9)* .007 ( 0.9)
LIBSTU —385.678 C 1.4) —139.591 ( 0.7) —.076 C 1.1) —.055 ( 0.6)
STUPAC —19.783 (0.4) —.972 (0.0) —.008 (0.8) —.008 (0.6)
LCOMP 1.120 ( 5.0) .284 ( 0.9)
Constant 1713.129 ( 1.6)
.178
1655.337
—.023
( 2.4) —3.833
.254
( 1.6) 4.545
—.027
( 1.3)
* Coefficient is statistic.Ily significantly different from zero
level; two—tail test.
at the .05
where COMP — median base salary and fringe benefits of law school's full—time
faculty in 1986—87
LCOMP — logarithm of COMP
LIBSTU — total number of volumes (in 000's) in the law school's library/
number of first—year students
STUTAC — student/faculty ratio in the school
Source: 1) Barron's Guide to Law School's: Seventh Edition (Mauppage. NT:
-
Barron's Educational Services. Inc., 1986) — LIBST1J,STUFAC.
2) American Bar Association, Memorandum QS8687—3, November 11, 1987— COMP.
Tuition and Fees
(o
Table 5
1985—86 Law School Applicant and Accepted
Applicant Yield Equations
(absolute value t statistics)
Accepted Applicant Yield (AAY)
(1) (2)
All Schools ( — .385/n — 155)
GOR .0000 (0.4) —.001 (1.1)
tO
—.1423 (5.2)*
LI
—.0659 (5.2)*
Constant 1.6068 (7.3)* .9802 (9.3)*
.165 .163
Private Schools • .348/n — 86)
GOR .0004 (1.7)
tO
—.2294 (3.6)*
LI
Constant 2.2693 (4.4)*
.123
Applicant Yield (AY)
(1) (2)
.198/n — 165)
—.0001 (0.6) —.0002 (1.5)
—.0839 (2.5)*
—.0299 (1.9)*
.9577 (3.5) .5173 (3.9)*
.044 .029
(AY —
.170/n = 95)
—.0002 (2.O)*
—.1375 (4.1)*
1.4683 (5.3)*
.371
Public Schools (— .431/n — 69) (V — .228/n — 70)
GOR —.0003 (1.5) —.0004 (1.9) .0001 (0.3) .0000 (0.1)
tO
—.0599 (1.3) —.0124 (0.1)
LI
—.0632 (1.9) .0727 (1.1)
Constant 1.0392 (2.8)* 1.031 (4.1)* .2864 (0.4) —.3323 (0.7)
.064 .089 —.028 —.009
*Coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the .05
level; two—tail test.
*Applicant yield equals enrolled first—year students/applicants; accepted
applicant yield equals enrolled first—year students/accepted applicants.
and
LO — logarithm of tuition and fees for full—tine students, out of state
students figures used for public law schools.
LI — logarithm of tuition and fees for full—time students, in—state students
figures used for public law schools.
Table 6
Comparison of Law School Tuition and Law Scho1
Graduates' Starting Salaries in Seven Cities
Year/City Boston Chicago Los Angeles Philadelphia Milwaukee New York Washington
A) Ratio of Law School Tuition to Starting Salary
1976 .22 .26 .16 .27 .20 .20 .19
1977 .22 .26 .19 .29 .19 .20 .19
1978 .25 .31 .15 .32 .20 .20 .21
1979 .25 .32 .17 .32 .19 .26 .21
1980 .27 .33 .15 .32 .18 .27 .23
1981 .29 .34 .17 .33 .19 .29 .25
1982 .32 .37 .19 .35 .23 .33 .28
1983 .36 .40 .19 .39 .23 .35 .31
1984 .32 .32 .15 .37 .22 .28 .29
1985 .34 .31 .15 .37 .22 .28 .29
1986 .34 .32 — .37 .24 .30 .32
B) Difference Between Starting Salary and Tuition in Real Terms
1976 $11,073 $11,046 $13,000 $10,362 $11,059 $13,230 $12,943
1977 11,491 10.865 13,050 9,810 11,565 13,947 13,717
1978 10.416 9,004 12,869 8,890 10,701 14,892 12,479
1979 10,143 8,987 11,958 9.036 11,663 11,810 13.137
1980 9,352 8,622 12,068 9,307 12,589 11,176 12,358
1981 8,881 8,704 11,217 8,830 11,095 10,248 11,230
1982 8,274 8,055 10,081 8,464 10,003 9.041 9.944
1983 7,532 7,393 10,314 7,441 9.880 8,787 9,293
1984 9,560 10,725 13,886 8,523 10,553 12,770 11,119
1985 9,467 11,595 14,147 8,710 10,136 13,435 10,967
1986 10,023 11,748 — 9.514 10.071 12,744 10,658
5Average starting salaries in the city are for the class of (year) in nonpatent law
firms in the city. Tuition and fees data for full—time students are for Harvard
(Boston), Chicago (Chicago , UCLA—out—of—state (Los Angeles), Pennsylvania (Phila-
delphia), Marquette (Milwaukee), NYU (New York City) and Georgetown (Washington, DC).
Sources: Student Lawyer's "Annual Salary Survey" (various issues, November 1976 to
November 1986) — salary.
Anerican Bar Association Memoranda QS8586—53 (July 28, 1986) and QS868748
(December 3, 1986) — tuition and fee..
1987 Economic Report of the President (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, January 1987), Table B55 — consumer price index.
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Table 8
Ratio of the Average Starting Salaries of Lawyers in
Nonpatent Law Firms to the Average Starting Salaries
of Graduates With Other Degrees
Classof Ri P.2 P.3 P.4 KS
1975 1.046 1.808 1.698 a 0.987
1976 1.020 1.741 1.645 a 0.974
1977 1.045 1.820 1.708 a 0.981
1978 0.991 1.704 1.662 a 0.917
1979 0.986 1.616 1.634 1.414 0.909
1980 0.969 1.620 1.623 1.389 0.883
1981 0.945 1.570 1.621 1.388 0.863
1982 0.934 1.555 1.551 1.292 0.862
1983 0.938 1.506 1.574 1.307 0.823
1984 1.077 1.731 1.761 1.536 1.006
1985 1.135 1.850 1.750 1.563 1.065
1986 1.127 1.771 1.711 1.525 1.056
1987 1.170 1.820 1.685 1.560 1.077
aData are not available to do the calculations
where
Ri — LSALIASAL1 P.3 — LSAL/ASAL3 P.S - LSAL/ASALS
9.2 - LSAL/ASAL2 R4 - LSAL/ASAL4
See Table 7 for variable definitions and for sources of the data.
Table 9
Estimated Change in the Present Value of a Law School
Degree Relative to the Present Value of
Alternative Degrees*
using data
in all columns while column
Time Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1975—76 From 1974—75 S —2,462 $ 13,275 $ 12,971 $ — * —1,398
1976—77 1975—76 10,963 30,122 28,834 — 4,295
1977—78 1976—77
—13,174 4,296 9,214 — —20,118
1978—79 1977—78 1,856 18,925 24,913 — —3,612
1979—80 1978—79 —2.177 45,317 43,645 34,260 —15,249
1980—81 1979—80
—8,201 50,536 59,255 48,321 —17,736
1981—82 1980—81 —4,630 48,143 38,202 19,035 —7,035
1982—83 1981—82 5,006 27,457 45,165 37,316 —41,142
1983—84 1982—83 121,733 162,067 152,429 166,563 167,000
1984—85 1983—84 59,955 87,045 54,294 60,452 61,449
1985—86 1984—85 11,770 37,506 45,079 37,433 4,316
1986—87 1985—86 58,722 81,841 56,523 72,912 36,232
Author's calculations
TPRV and CPI are used
from Table 7 and equation (5) in the text.
(1) uses LSAL and ASAL1
(2) uses LSAL and ASAL2
(3) uses LSAL and ASAL3
(4) uses LSAL and ASAL4
(5) uses LSAL and ASAL5
See Table 7 for variable definitions.
*A positive number implies law degree was becoming relatively more attractive
as compared to the alternative. A negative number implies the opposite.
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Table 10
Average Salaries for Young Lawyers in Nonpatent
Law Firms, By Experience: 1982—1986
(S) — starting salary
(1) — salary with one year's experience
(2) — salary with two yeaxs' experience
(3) — salary with three years'experience
(4) — salary with four years' experience
(S)
22.5
23.0
28.5
30.0
33.0
(S)
23.0
25.0
33.0
35.0
36.5
Source: Student Lawyer's "Annual Salary Surveys" (November 1982, 1983, 1984,
1985, 1986 issues).
AtlantailL QL L
24.0 25.0 26.0 28.0 29.0
25.5 27.0 28.5 30.0 31.0
29.5 32.0 34.0 37.0 39.5
29.0 31.0 33.0 37.5 42.0
30.5 32.0 34.5 38.0 43.5i .W Chicago!L !
23.5 24.5 25.5 27.0 28.5
24.0 25.5 27.0 28.5 29.5
32.0 33.5 36.0 37.5 39.5
35.5 36.5 38.0 42.5 47.0
37.5 38.0 39.0 43.0 48.0
28.5
31.0
40.0
43.0
45.0
Boston
ilL -
24.0 25.5 27.0Q 26.8 29.0
31.0 2.2 37.5
32.5 37.5 39.0
36.5 39.0 41.5
Los Angeles
(1) (2) (3)
25.0 26.5 28.0
27.0 29.5 31.0
34.0 36.0 38.0
36.5 37.0
.t9..9
38.0 39.0 41.5
Washington, DC
(1) (2) (3)
27.0 28.5 30.0
LQ 29.5 31.0
33.0 38.0 41.0
33.5 39.5
34.5 40.0 45.0
30.0
33.0
46.5
47.0
47.5
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
(S)
25.0
26.5
36.0
39.0
40.0
New York
ilL ilL
27.0 29.0
29.0 31.5
37.5 40.0
41.0 43.0
43.0 45.0
(3)
31.0
34.0
1e3.5
46.0
48.0
32.5
36.5
46.0
48.5
50.0
(S)
25.5
26.5
31.5
33.0
34.0
where
32.0
33.0
45.0
46.5
48.0
